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112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992)
Patricia D. Green
I. INTRODUCTION
Our nation is constantly faced with the problems of racial discrimination. One
area in which this discrimination is particularly troublesome is public education.
Certainly, no one can deny that all children, regardless of race, deserve equal edu-
cational opportunities in this nation. Nor does anyone doubt the validity of the Su-
preme Court's requirement in Brown v. Board of Education1 that school systems
eliminate the effects of past racial discrimination. However, exactly what is meant
by this directive and how it is to be accomplished has been the subject of much
debate.2
Freeman v. Pitts3 is the latest in a long line of Supreme Court cases dealing with
the desegregation of our nation's public schools. 4 It comes at a time when more
people than ever are confused as to what is required by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the holding of this case, while re-
maining consistent with the holdings in the cases preceding it, gives some new in-
sight into what is required by the mandate in Brown and into what the future might
hold for the many school districts still subject to desegregation orders.
II. FACTS
A. Past Litigation
DeKalb County School System (DCSS) is one of many school districts through-
out the nation affected by the Supreme Court's mandate in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.' Like many school systems nationwide, the district's response to this order
was both slow and inadequate.8 In fact, DCSS was segregated by law until 1966
when it adopted a freedom-of-choice plan which allowed its students to choose the
school they wanted to attend.7
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See infra notes 41-257 and accompanying text.
3. 112S. Ct. 1430(1992).
4. See infra notes 41-257 and accompanying text.
5. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436. The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Fucation found that segregation of
public schools based on race violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), and ordered the
school systems to do away with this practice "with all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349
U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
6. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436.
7. Id.
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However, when the Supreme Court determined in 1968 in Green v. County
School Board8 that such freedom-of-choice plans did not adequately address the
problem of segregation, the school district was required to take further action.' At
this point, students filed a class action in the district court against DCSS. 0 In re-
sponse to this class action, DCSS voluntarily began investigating what measures
should be taken to desegregate the school district. " This investigation led to a con-
sent order in which DCSS agreed to close all of its minority schools and reassign
all of its students. 12
DCSS made much progress pursuant to this consent order, and little judicial in-
tervention was required.13 However, DCSS continued to have difficulties with its
minority to majority ("M-to-M") program which allowed students who were in the
majority at their assigned school to transfer to a school where they were in the mi-
nority. "
B. Present Litigation
In 1986 DCSS petitioned the court for dismissal of the class action along with a
finding that the school district was unified. 5 In considering whether DCSS was
unitary, the district court looked to the essential factors named in Green as well as
to the quality of education available to black students as compared with white stu-
dents. 1
The district court called DCSS "'an innovative school system that has travelled
the often long road to unitary status almost to its end."' 7 The court also deter-
mined that DCSS was unified except with respect to teacher assignments, alloca-
tion of resources and quality of education. 8 Thus, the district court determined
that further relief would be ordered only in the areas found not to be unified. 9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit over-
ruled the district court's determination that DCSS was unified in certain aspects,
stating that all Green factors should be considered together. 2 It further stated that
in order to achieve unitary status, a school system must comply with all Green fac-
tors for many years.21 Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals, stating that the district court did indeed have the
8. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).




13. Id. at 1437.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The factors named in Green are: "faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facili-
ties." Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
17. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1437 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a).
18. Id. at 1437.
19. Id.




authority to dismiss this suit in increments .22 It then remanded the case to the court
of appeals for further consideration of whether DCSS had fully complied with its
good faith obligation to desegregate.23
III. HISTORY
The fight for racial equality in public education began with the now famous Su-
preme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education.24 Brown consolidated four
similar cases from different states in an effort to address the growing problem of
segregation by law or de jure segregation.25 Each of these cases dealt with local
statutes which either required or allowed public schools to segregate their students
by race. 26 While in some cases the separate schools were found to be operated une-
qually, all but one of these cases upheld the validity of these statutes based on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson.7
However, Brown squarely confronted Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine, and
the Supreme Court held that any school system segregated by law could not be
considered equal.28 In past cases, the Court had considered only whether minority
schools and white schools were equal in all aspects.29 In Brown, however, the
Court stated that "[w]e must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on pub-
lic education."30
22. Id. at 1443.
23. Id. at 1450.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
25. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486-88 & n. 1. In Brown, minority students brought suit in federal district court in an
effort to prevent the state of Kansas from enforcing a statute allowing segregation by race in its public schools. Id.
at 486 n. 1. The district court had denied an injunction, stating that the black schools were equal in most respects
to the white schools. Id.
The facts in Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board were substantially similar to the situation in
Brown except that the statutes involved required segregation by race. Id. at 486-87 n. 1. Here, however, the dis-
trict court found that the minority schools were not of the same quality as the white schools. Id. As a result, the
court ordered the school system to take immediate measures to make the minority schools equal to the white
schools. Id. However, the court found the statutes themselves to be valid and refused to allow minority students to
attend the white schools during the equalization process. Id.
In Gebhart v. Belton,. minority students brought suit to prevent enforcement of a statute in Delaware which also
required segregation by race. Id. at 487-88 n. 1. In this case, however, the court determined that the minority
schools were inferior and ordered the district to enroll the minority students in the white schools. Id. The court
further determined that segregation itself created inferior schools. Id.
26. Brown, 347 U.S. at 487-88.
27. Id. at 488. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court addressed the question of whether rail-
road companies could segregate their passengers by race. Id. at 540. In Plessy a man was forced off of a train and
jailed for sitting in the "white" section of the train pursuant to a statute which allowed for segregation by race. Id.
at 541-42. In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 543. In determining that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the assumption that the en-
forced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.
Id. at 551. The Court concluded by stating that "[i] f the civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot
be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane." Id. at 551-52.
28. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
29. Id. at 491-92.
30. Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
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In looking into the effects of segregation on minority students, the Court said
that "[tlo separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely be-
cause of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the commu-
nity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.""1
This attitude led to the finding that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."32 Thus, the Court found that maintaining separate educational facilities
based on race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution." The Court then ordered further inquiry in or-
der to determine an appropriate remedy for this constitutional violation.'
This further inquiry led to yet another Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown
II)." In Brown H, the Court determined that supervision of the desegregation of
the nation's public schools should fall into the hands of the district courts which
"[b]ecause of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further
hearings. . . [could] best perform this judicial appraisal."36
The Supreme Court continued by recognizing the difficulties involved in such
massive overhaul of the public schools.37 Therefore, it ordered that desegregation
be effectuated "as soon as practicable."38 The school districts were left with a final
order-to comply with the directives of Brown H "with all deliberate speed."39
Since Brown and Brown H, state school systems have taken drastic measures in
attempting to avoid compliance with the mandates of the Supreme Court.4° For in-
stance, in Goss v. Board of Education,4" the local school system incorporated into
its desegregation plan a transfer program which allowed any students who were in
the minority at their assigned school to transfer to another school where they
would be in the majority.42 Plaintiffs in this case contended that this transfer pro-
gram ran counter to Brown in that it was based only on the students' race.'
The Court in Goss found that the transfer program violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." It stated further that the transfer program
"lends itself to perpetuation of segregation."' This program was struck down be-
cause its effect was to promote segregation rather than to prohibit it.'
31. Id. at 494.
32. Id. at 495.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 495-96 (footnote omitted).
35. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
36. Id. at 299.
37. Id. at 300.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 301.
40. See infra notes 41-74 and accompanying text.
41. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
42. Id. at 684.
43. Id. at 684-85.
44.Id. at 689.
45. Id. at 686.
46. Id. at 688.
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Perhaps the most blatant attempt to avoid school desegregation, however, may
be found in Griffin v. County School Board.47 After Brown required Virginia to
take steps to desegregate its public schools, the state was reluctant to comply with
this mandate.A In an attempt to avoid school desegregation, the state in 1956
amended its constitution to allow funds to be given to students attending non-reli-
gious private schools.49 The General Assembly then closed all public schools at-
tended by both white students and minority students. ° However, the Virginia
Supreme Court found this legislation to be unconstitutional.s Further attempts to
avoid desegregation led to the implementation of a "freedom-of-choice" plan and
to the repealing of the laws requiring school attendance. This allowed each school
district to choose whether to require attendance.52
In response to this legislation and as a result of a Fourth Circuit decision requir-
ing Prince Edward County to desegregate, 3 the county refused to open its public
schools." Private schools were made available for the white students in the county,
but the minority students rejected offers to open a private school for them.5 After
1960, these private schools were largely funded by the tuition grant program
adopted by the General Assembly. 6
Thus, in 1961 minority students sought a court order preventing the county
from paying these funds. 7 The district court ordered the county to stop giving tui-
tion grants until the public schools reopened but abstained from deciding whether
the schools could remain closed, leaving this decision for the state court.5 8 How-
ever, prior to the state court's decision on this matter, the district court later held
that "the public schools of Prince Edward County may not be closed to avoid the
effect of the law of the land as interpreted by the Supreme Court, while the Com-
monwealth of Virginia permits other public schools to remain open at the expense
of the taxpayers."'59 Subsequently, the county supervisors filed a suit for declara-
tory judgment asking the district court to allow the state courts to make their deci-
sion before ruling."0 The district court again refused to abstain.61
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed this decision, stating that "the District Court should have abstained to
await state court determination of the validity of the tuition grants and tax credits,





52. Id. at 221-22.
53. See Allen v. County Sch. Bd., 266 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1959).
54. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 222-23.
55.Id. at 223.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 224.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Allen v. County Sch. Bd., 207 F. Supp. 349, 355 (E.D. Va. 1962)).
60. Id. at 225.
61. Id.
1993]
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as well as the validity of the closing of the public schools. "62 The Supreme Court
subsequently granted certiorari "in view of the long delay in the case. . . and the
importance of the questions presented."63
In determining whether the actions of the district court were proper, the Su-
preme Court looked to various procedural matters not important to this discus-
sion. 4 The Court then turned to the question of whether closing the public schools
denied the minority students their Fourteenth Amendment rights."5 While the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause did not require Virginia's counties to
be treated the same, 66 it further looked to the effect that closing the county's public
schools had on minority students.67 The Supreme Court then stated, "[wihatever
nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to abandon public
schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposi-
tion to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional."" Thus, the Supreme Court
held this action to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.9
The Court next considered what remedies would be appropriate for this viola-
tion. " In so doing, the Court found that the district court did indeed have the au-
thority to prevent the school district from paying tuition grants.71 It went even
further, however, stating that "the District Court may. . . require the Supervisors
to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen,
operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system in
Prince Edward County."72 The Court concluded by stating that "[t]he time for
mere 'deliberate speed' has run out, and that phrase can no longer justify denying
...constitutional rights to an [equal] education. 73 Thus, the Court reversed the
62. Id. (citing Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963)).
63. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 375 U.S. 391, 392 (1963)).
64. First, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the supplemental pleading filed in 1961 was
in reality a new cause of action. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 226. The Court stated that the complaint "was not a new
cause of action but merely part of the same old cause of action arising out of the continued desire of colored stu-
dents in Prince Edward County to have the same opportunity. . . afforded to white people." Id.
Further, respondents argued that when the original case decided with Brown was remanded to the district
court, it was in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 that only a single judge took jurisdiction rather than the original
panel of three judges. Id. at 227. The Supreme Court ruled, though, that the three judge panel need only preside
over cases affecting the general public and not those cases affecting a specific district. Id. at 228.
The respondents further argued that this suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. However, the Court
reiterated that injunctions against state officials were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. (citing Exparte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
The final procedural issue addressed by the Court was whether the district court should have abstained from
this question. Id. In determining that this case was not one for abstention, the Court stated that "[tlhere has been
entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights." Id. at 229.
65. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 230.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 230-31.
68. Id. at 231.
69. Id. at 232.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 233.
73. Id. at 234.
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judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court to do
whatever necessary to guarantee minority students an equal education.74
The next step in the long road toward racial desegregation led to the decisions in
both Green v. County School Board"5 and Raney v. Board of Education. 76 Green
was the first Supreme Court case to consider the effectiveness of "freedom-of-
choice" plans where students were required each year to determine for themselves
which school they would attend.77
In 1965 minority students in Virginia brought suit against the county to order
the school district to desegregate.78 Prior to Brown, the New Kent County Schools
were segregated by law, with the white students attending one public high school
and the minority students attending a separate public high school.79 This was true
despite the fact that there existed no residential segregation throughout the
county.
80
After Brown made dejure segregation unlawful, Virginia made many attempts
at bypassing this requirement. 8' One such attempt included the Pupil Placement
Act82 which required that school age children be reassigned to whatever school
they had attended the year before. 83 However, any student could apply to attend
another school. 84 Up to September 1964 no students had requested a transfer.
85
In 1965 the school board asked the court to dismiss the preceding suit because
the minority students had not requested to be transferred to the "white" school.86
Later, however, the school board voluntarily instituted what it called a "freedom-
of-choice" plan in an effort to desegregate its schools.87 This plan enabled students
to choose each year which school they wanted to attend.88 If any student failed to
choose between the schools, he or she was reassigned to his or her previous
school.89 A later amendment to this plan also addressed racially nondiscriminatory
staff and teacher placement.90 This plan, as amended, was approved by the district
court, and part of that decision was affirmed by the court of appeals which ordered
the district court to determine a provision for the teachers "'which is much more
74. Id.
75. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
76. 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
77. Green, 391 U.S. at 431-32.
78. Id. at 432.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 432-33.
82. VA. CODE §§ 22-232.1 et seq. (1964).




87. Id. The school board did so to remain eligible for financial assistance from the federal government. Id.
88. Id. at 433-34.
89. Id. at 434.
90. Id.
1993]
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specific and more comprehensive."'91 The Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari. 92
In considering the adequacy of the "freedom-of-choice" plan in ending segrega-
tion by law, the Supreme Court stated that it would be necessary to look to five
areas in determining whether the effects of de jure segregation had been elimi-
nated. 93 These five areas included: "faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular
activities and facilities."" The Court further stated that the directives of Brown II
were only the first step toward eliminating dejure segregation.9 5 It continued say-
ing that "open[ing] the doors of the former 'white' school to Negro children and of
the 'Negro' school to white children merely begins, not ends, our inquiry whether
the Board has taken steps adequate to abolish its dual, segregated system. " "
The Supreme Court interpreted Brown II as placing an "affirmative duty" to
eliminate all evidence of racial discrimination. 7 It further found it to be the obli-
gation of the district courts to maintain jurisdiction over the various segregation
cases until the school boards could be shown to be acting in good faith in attempt-
ing to desegregate their school systems." It then ordered the district court to "re-
tain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely
removed." 99
Turning to the issue of the adequacy of the "freedom-of-choice" plan itself, the
Court said:
We do not hold that "freedom of choice" can have no place in such a plan. We do not
hold that a "freedom-of-choice" plan might of itself be unconstitutional, although
that argument has been urged upon us. Rather, all we decide today is that in desegre-
gating a dual system a plan utilizing "freedom of choice" is not an end in itself.100
The Court concluded its inquiry by finding that, as the school system in question
was still a "dual system," the "freedom-of-choice" plan could not be considered a
sufficient step toward the elimination of segregation by race in this public school
system."' Since the plan in reality placed the burden Brown H had put on the
school district into the hands of the children and their parents, the Supreme Court
ordered the school board to revise its plan to make it one that might realistically
work. 102
91. Id. at 434-35 (quoting Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1967)).
92. Id. at 435. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 389 U.S. 1003 (1967).
93. Id. at 435.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 436.
96. Id. at437.
97. Id. at 437-38.
98. Id. at 439.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 439-40.
101. Id. at 441.
102. Id. at 441-42.
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The facts in Raney, a case decided on the same day, are very similar to those in
Green. "0 One difference, however, was the fact that minority students in Raney
had applied to attend the "white" school."' Since applications to that school had
exceeded the space available in it, several of these minority students' applications
were denied. 0 ' These students subsequently filed suit against the school district to
be permitted to attend the school of their choice."'8 The district court denied the
request, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed this decision." 7 Again, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari"'8 and decided, as in Green, that the "freedom-of-choice"
plan proposed by the school district was not sufficient. 09
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners" ' came at the same time as both Green and
Raney. It dealt with a variant of the "freedom-of-choice" plan called "free trans-
fer."1 ' In this plan, students were assigned to different schools according to the
geographic boundaries of the school district along with a provision allowing any
student to transfer to another school in the district when there was space available
at that school.
112
In 1964 minority students filed suit against the school board alleging that this
"free transfer" program was being administered in a racially discriminatory fash-
ion. 1 I The district court found that the school board had indeed discriminated in
its duties by denying minority students' transfer requests but allowing the requests
of the white students. " 4 The district court further held that the board had pro-
duced the attendance zones in the elementary schools by gerrymandering; how-
ever, the attendance zones for the junior high schools were appropriately drawn to
produce "meaningful desegregation."115'
The Supreme Court questioned the effectiveness of the "free transfer" program,
stating that it "'lends itself to perpetuation of segregation.'"16 It stated also that "if
it cannot be shown that such a plan will further rather than delay conversion to a
unitary, nonracial, nondiscriminatory school system, it must be held unaccepta-
ble."' 7 The case was finally remanded to the district court for further investiga-
tion into an appropriate and effective remedy.
1 18
103. Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 445 (1968).
104. Id. at 446.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 447 (citing Raney v. Board of Educ., 381 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967)).
108. See Raney v. Board of Educ., 389 U.S. 1034 (1968).
109. Raney, 391 U.S. at 447.
110. 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
111. lId. at 452.
112. Id. at 453-54.
113. Id. at 454.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 454-55.
116. Id. at 459 (quoting Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 686 (1963)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 459-60.
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As school districts continued to be objects of dejure segregation, more drastic
steps were taken to end racial discrimination in the schools.119 For example, in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,12 the Court more thor-
oughly addressed the power granted to the district courts through their equity ju-
risdiction.
Swann began in largely the same manner as all of the previous school desegre-
gation cases in that the school board had a long history of dejure segregation. 121
Upon finding that this state-imposed segregation still existed, the district court or-
dered the school district to come up with a plan to eliminate discrimination. 122 The
court found the board's plan unacceptable and requested that Dr. John Finger de-
vise another plan to end racial discrimination. 123 The school board's plan restruc-
tured the attendance zones of the students to attempt a better racial mix' 24 while the
"Finger Plan" relied heavily on busing and what it called "satellite zones" which
moved students from their residential areas to other area schools to achieve the
maximum racial balance in the school system. 125 At the junior high and high school
level, the district court adopted the school board plan with some alterations by Dr.
Finger, but at the elementary school level it adopted the "Finger Plan" in its en-
tirety.126 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed this decision as re-
lated to the elementary schools, stating that busing created an unreasonable
burden on the students.1
27
In determining whether the district court had appropriately used its equitable
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reiterated that "the objective ...remains to
eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation."1 28 It
continued by stating that "[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the
scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." 129
The Court next turned to the question of whether a constitutional violation was
present and briefly reviewed the Green factors.130 In so doing the Court recognized
that different remedies may be appropriate for different violations. 131 It stated that
"where it is possible to identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' simply by refer-
ence to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings
119. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of
Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
120. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
121. Id. at 5-6.
122. Id. at 7.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id.
125. Id. at9.
126. Id. at 10.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 15.
129. Id.




and equipment, or the organization of sports activities, aprimafacie case of viola-
tion of substantive constitutional rights. . . is shown. "132 After determining that a
constitutional violation existed, the Court reviewed what remedial measures
might be appropriate. 
1 3
The Supreme Court first considered whether it would be appropriate to use ra-
cial quotas to eliminate discrimination.II It had been alleged that the district court
had imposed quotas on the school system, but the Court found no evidence to vali-
date that allegation. 131 It went on to say that the Constitution does not require
every school to represent the racial mixture of the neighborhood in which it is
found.13' However, the Court agreed that quotas might be acceptable as "a starting
point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement." 3
This idea led to a ruling that the use of quotas as a guideline was not an abuse of the
district court's discretion.138
The Court next turned to the question of the constitutionality of one-race
schools."9 It stated that "the existence of some small number of one-race ....
schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still prac-
tices segregation.""m However, the Court warned that where school systems had
been plagued with the effects of de jure segregation and where one-race schools
exist, there was created a presumption of a constitutional violation. 14' The Court
further placed on the school systems "the burden of showing that such school as-
signments are genuinely nondiscriminatory. "142
Next, the Court considered the appropriateness of the use of gerrymandering to
desegregate schools within a system."a The Court agreed that in a system not
plagued with a history of discrimination such gerrymandering might be inappro-
priate, but where racial segregation still exists courts may order measures even
though they may be "administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bi-
zarre."'" Thus, gerrymandering was found to be an appropriate remedial mea-
sure.
145
Finally, the Supreme Court questioned whether the use of busing would be ap-
propriate in achieving the goal of desegregation." In finding that busing was also
an acceptable remedy in this case, the Court determined that the time and distance
132. Id.
133. Id. at 22.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 23.
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id. at 25.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 26.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 27.
144. Id. at 28.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 29.
1993l
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
traveled would not be too great and would not place a large burden on the stu-
dents. 147 In fact, it determined that in some cases the time and distance would be
less when busing was employed."4 As a result, the Court found that ordering the
use of busing was not an abuse of the district court's discretion. "'
After determining that the district court's actions had been proper, the Supreme
Court concluded with a reminder that once a school system has been unified it is
not "constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments" to its pro-
grams.' This reminder stemmed from the prevalent notion that segregation for
the sake of segregation is not the aim of Swann and cases like it; it is only state
imposed segregation and its effects that must be attacked. 5 Once this dejure seg-
regation is found to exist, however, the Supreme Court will allow great latitude in
enforcing the constitutional rights of the minority students.152
Perhaps the most drastic measures allowed by the Court can be found in Wright
v. Council of Emporia"5 3 and United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Educa-
tion. " In these cases, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the
district courts had the authority to prevent a city from forming its own school sys-
tem. 155
In Wright, the town of Emporia, Virginia, decided to become a city but paid the
county to continue its control over the school system. '5 6 However, after Greens-
ville County became subject to a court order requiring a desegregation plan, the
city attempted to create its own school district. 157 The district court enjoined the
city from creating its own district because it felt that this action would prevent ef-
fective desegregation of the Greensville school district. 1 8 The court of appeals
used the "dominant purpose" rule in reversing the decision of the district court,
stating that dejure segregation was not the "dominant purpose" for the new school
district. 59
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the ruling of the court of appeals and
found that the district court was acting within its authority in denying the creation
of a new school system. 6' The Court said it was necessary to look to the effect and
not merely to the purpose of an action in determining whether that action was a
constitutional violation."'6 Here, the Court determined that the district court was
147. Id. at 30.
148. Id.
149. Id. at31.
150. Id. at 32.
151. Id. at 15.
152. Id.
153. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
154. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
155. Wright, 407 U.S. at 453; Scotland Neck, 407 U.S. at 485.
156. Wright, 407 U.S. at 453-54.
157. Id. at 456.
158. Id. at 458.
159. Id. at 460-61.




justified in finding that creating a new school district would deprive the minority
students of their constitutional rights162 and further agreed that "Emporia's estab-
lishment of a separate system would actually impede the process of dismantling
the existing dual system."163 It concluded by stating that where a more effective
method of eliminating segregation exists, the burden of proof is on the school
board to explain its use of the less effective method."
In Chief Justice Burger's dissent, in which Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Re-
hnquist joined, he stated that the district court's actions were an abuse of its discre-
tion.16 Burger argued that effective desegregation could be achieved even with the
existence of two separate school districts. 16 6 Thus, he stated that "if local authori-
ties devise a plan that will effectively eliminate segregation in the schools, a dis-
trict court must accept such a plan unless there are strong reasons why a different
plan is to be preferred."167 Burger further argued that, as there would only be a
modest difference in the racial make-up of the schools either with or without the
existence of separate districts, a discriminatory effect could not be presumed with-
out evidence of a discriminatory purpose. 168
Scotland Neck also dealt with the question of the district court's authority to pre-
vent the creation of a new school system. 69 Again, the Court found that "any at-
tempt. . . to carve out a new school district from an existing district that is in the
process of dismantling a dual school system 'must be judged according to whether
it hinders or furthers the process of school desegregation.""70 It therefore held that
it was proper for the district court to prevent the creation of a school district that
"would have the effect of impeding the disestablishment of the dual school sys-
tem.1
71
Concurring with the majority, Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justices Black-
mun, Powell and Rehnquist joined, agreed that this new school district would un-
dermine the efforts of the larger school district and preclude meaningful
desegregation. 172 He further stated that the city was largely motivated by its desire
to avoid desegregation; thus, this discriminatory purpose was sufficient to allow
the district court to prevent the creation of this new school district. 1
73
Up until 1976 it seemed no measures, however drastic, would be beyond the
authority of the district courts in eliminating segregation. 74 However, some limi-
162. Id. at 463.
163. Id. at 466.
164. Id. at 467 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968)).
165. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 471 (1972) (Burger, C.., dissenting).
166. Id. at 476.
167. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 482-83.
169. Scotland Neck, 407 U.S. at 485.
170. Id. at 489 (quoting Wright, 407 U.S. at 460).
171. Id. at 490.
172. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484,491 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
173. Id. at 492.
174. See supra notes 41-173 and accompanying text.
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tations on the discretion of the district courts became apparent in Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler."17 In Pasadena, a suit was brought against the
school board to eliminate discrimination. 176 The district court in 1970 ordered the
school board to submit a plan of desegregation for its approval.177 The plan as fi-
nally approved included a requirement that no school have an enrollment that con-
sisted of a majority of minority students.178
In 1974 the school board sought modification of the judgment, requesting that
this requirement be deleted from the desegregation order. 79 The district court de-
nied its request and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this deci-
sion with reservation. 1
80
The Supreme Court found that, while there had subsequently been an "ostensi-
ble" violation of the plan, there had been full compliance in the first year of its im-
plementation. 1 81 Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to modify the order. It further stated that as the
district was unified at one time, it required a subsequent constitutional violation in
order to require adjustments to the student attendance format.' 82 In conclusion, the
Court held that "the District Court was not entitled to require the [Pasadena Uni-
fied School District] to rearrange its attendance zones each year to ensure that the
racial mix desired by the court was maintained in perpetuity."83
Justices Marshall and Brennan, in dissenting, argued that the district court did
not abuse its discretion because the school board had never fully cooperated with
the court order. '" They further argued that unification for merely a short period of
time was not necessarily sufficient. 18' They stated that as the modification was re-
quested before the violation was remedied fully, the district court's decision
should be affirmed.18
6
The Supreme Court, in Milliken v. Bradley, 187 also balked at allowing the district
courts to order interdistrict desegregation plans. In Milliken, the National Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") brought suit requesting
a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of Act 48, a statute they ar-
gued prevented the effective desegregation of the Detroit City Schools. 88 The dis-
175. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
176. Id. at 427. In this case, the United States intervened as a party. Id. Later, it was this intervention which
prevented the dismissal of this suit as moot because the plaintiffs had failed to make the suit a class action. Id. at
429-30.
177. Id. at 428.




182. Id. at 434-45 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971)).
183. Id. at 436.
184. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,441 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 442.
186. Id. at 444.
187. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
188. Id. at 722-23.
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trict court refused to grant the preliminary injunction, but the court of appeals
reversed that decision.189 On remand, the district court ordered the submission of
desegregation plans, with a "Magnet Plan" finally approved for desegregating De-
troit's schools.19 The court of appeals subsequently affirmed this decision and or-
dered the district court to proceed with a trial on the merits of the case.191
At the resulting trial, the district court found that there existed state-imposed
segregation because the use of optional zones foreseeably resulted in segrega-
tion.192 Reasons for this ruling included the fact that the district created North-
South running zones when East-West running zones would be more effective and
the fact that most schools in the district were in predominantly minority or pre-
dominantly white neighborhoods.1 93 It further determined that the Act impeded
desegregation.1 94 In shaping a remedy, the district court found that intra-district
plans were ineffective in eliminating discrimination and ordered the submission of
inter-district plans for this purpose.19 The court made this finding without deter-
mining that any of the other districts had participated in discriminatory prac-
tices. 196 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court but
required the court to ensure that all suburban school districts affected by this deci-
sion would have an opportunity to be heard.197
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court stated that the district court had
exceeded its authority in ordering such a remedy.1 98 The Court held that the dis-
trict court had gone beyond the directives in Brown in ordering an interdistrict
remedy without finding an interdistrict constitutional violation.1 99 The Court con-
cluded that it would require a showing that the district lines were drawn in a dis-
criminatory fashion to allow such a massive remedial measure.200
Justice Stewart concurred with the judgment and added that the action was not
an appropriate exercise of equity jurisdiction because the remedy was not equal to
the violation found.201 He further argued that the courts have the authority to at-
tack only what is found to be a constitutional violation.20 2 Justice Douglas dis-
sented, stating that the Court's decision takes a step back toward the "separate but
equal" doctrine found in Plessy. 20 As the creation of the school district lines cre-
189. Id. at 723.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 723-24.
192. Id. at 724-25.
193. Id. at 725.
194. Id. at 727.
195. Id. at 732-33.
196. Id. at 732.
197.Id. at 736.
198. Id. at 745.
199. Id. at 744-45 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
200. Id.
201. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 754 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 757.
203. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 759 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896)).
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ated or continued segregation, its effect was to make minority schools both "sepa-
rate" and "inferior. 20 4 Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Douglas,
Brennan and Marshall, called the majority decision an arbitrary limitation on the
district court's equitable powers.205 He feared that segregation would go unreme-
died without an interdistrict plan and concluded by stating that the district court
was in a better position to determine what was an appropriate remedy and that the
Supreme Court should not disturb its findings. 20
As had come to be the case in most school desegregation cases, the next case to
be decided by the Supreme Court, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,207 cen-
tered around the determination of an appropriate remedy for years of school segre-
gation by law. Here, however, the court looked again to the appropriateness of a
remedy employed initially in Swann: the use of quotas to desegregate the school
system.208 The plan proposed in this case required a certain racial quota to be
maintained within each school in the district, based on the black-white ratio of the
population.20 a This plan was employed after the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit had found the initial plan to be inadequate and ordered the district court to
formulate a new plan.210 This new plan was subsequently approved by the Sixth
Circuit.21
After granting certiorari, the Court stated that the main reason for hearing this
case was "for the issues it raises as to the proper allocation of functions between
the district courts and the courts of appeals within the federal judicial system."
212
In its decision, the Supreme Court recognized both the broad power of the lower
courts in the exercise of their equity powers and the need for local government to
remain autonomous.21 3 Often, these two objectives have collided, so it is impera-
tive for any exercise of equity jurisdiction by the district courts to be in response to
a claim that is "satisfactorily established by factual proof and justified by a rea-
soned statement of legal principles."214
The Supreme Court next considered the findings of fact of the district court.215
It stated that the district court had found that the schools in the school district were
indeed segregated, but they found no evidence of racial discrimination. 21 ' How-
ever, the court found a cumulative violation in the '"racially imbalanced schools,
204. Id. at 760-61.
205. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 780-81 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 769-70.
207. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
208. Id. at 408.
209. Id. at 408-09.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 408.
212. Id. at 409.
213. Id. at 410.
214. Id. (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)).
215. Id. at 410-12.
216. Id. at 412.
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optional attendance zones, and recent Board action."'217 The Supreme Court
agreed that the district court had a proper basis for determining that this violation
existed.218 However, it felt that the subsequent remedy required by the court of ap-
peals was an inappropriate response to the nature of the violation.219 In so holding,
the Court reiterated that "[t]he finding that the pupil population in the various
Dayton schools is not homogeneous, standing by itself, is not a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a showing that this condition resulted
from intentionally segregative actions on the part of the Board. 220
The Supreme Court held that it was improper for the court of appeals to order
such a drastic remedy while affirming the validity of the findings of fact of the dis-
trict court.22' The court of appeals did not have the authority to impose a larger
remedy simply because it was "vaguely dissatisfied" with the remedy proposed by
the district court.222 Thus, the Court concluded that "the Court of Appeals im-
posed a remedy which we think is entirely out of proportion to the constitutional
violations found by the District Court." 221 It then ordered the district court to con-
duct further investigation into the violation and tailor a remedy that would be ap-
propriate to address that wrong. 24 Justice Brennan, concurring, added that "[i]f it
is determined on remand that the School Board's unconstitutional actions had a
'systemwide impact,' then the court should order a 'systemwide remedy.' 225
The Supreme Court's decision in Dayton led to the next case in the history of
school desegregation cases: Columbus Board of Education v. Penick.226 In Colum-
bus, as in Dayton, the district court had ordered a district-wide remedy upon find-
ing that constitutionally violative practices existed . 2 7 Here, however, this remedy
was ordered as a result of what the district court found to be "systemwide" racial
discrimination. 28 The court of appeals affirmed this decision and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.229
In affirming this judgment, the Court looked briefly at the history of school de-
segregation,230 reaffirming that many past cases had imposed on the school dis-
tricts "an affirmative duty to desegregate." 23' The Court also addressed its holding
in Dayton that the court of appeals could not impose a systemwide remedy based
217. Id. at 413 (quoting Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1259 (S.D. Ohio 1977)).
218. Id. at 414.
219. Id. at 417.
220. Id. at 413.
221. Id. at 417.
222. Id. at 418.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 420.
225. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 423 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
226.443 U.S. 449 (1979).
227. Id. at 453-54.
228. Id. at 454.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 455-61. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v, County
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
231. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 459 (1977).
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on the findings of the district court.232 However, the Court distinguished this case
from Dayton, stating that the district court had made findings (that were supported
by the evidence) that the Columbus School Board had been practicing systemwide
racial discrimination which justified a systemwide remedy.233 As the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, it restated its long-standing
position that once a constitutional violation has been established, a district court
has broad power in formulating a remedy as long as that remedy addresses the vio-
lation prompting it.
234
The most recent school desegregation case to be addressed by the Supreme
Court, other than the instant case, was Board of Education v. Dowell.z35 This case
was different from the preceding cases in that it dealt with a request by the school
district to lift the injunction that had been present for many years.236
This case began in 1961 when minority students sought to end dejure segrega-
tion in the schools of Oklahoma City.237 On a finding that the school district had
indeed "intentionally" operated a "dual" school system and a subsequent finding
that the attempts by the school board to alleviate the effects of this discrimination
were insufficient, the district court ordered the adoption of a plan which incorpo-
rated neighborhood school assignment and busing to achieve a racial balance in the
district's schools. 238
After five years of compliance with the order, the school district in 1977 re-
quested that the district court close the case.239 In so doing, the district court found
that "'[tihe School Board, as now constituted, has manifested the desire and intent
to follow the law.' 2 40 Subsequently, it held that "[j]urisdiction in this case is termi-
nated . . . only to final disposition of any case now pending on appeal.' 241 The
plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's order.242
However, in 1984 certain demographic shifts in the school district led the
school board to consider new programs to alleviate some of the busing that they
felt had become too burdensome. 243 Thus, it adopted a Student Reassignment Plan
("SRP") to reduce the effects of busing on the school district.2" The board also al-
lowed for any student in the majority at a school to transfer to a school where that
student would be in the minority.
245
232. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465-66 (1979).
233. Id. at 466.
234. Id. at 465-66.
235. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).




240. Id. at 634 (quoting No. Civ-9452 (W.D. Okla. 1977); App. 174-176).







Plaintiffs then attempted to have the case reopened, arguing that the school dis-
trict had never been unified and that the SRP program caused a return to racially
segregated schools.246 The district court refused to hear the case again because it
said the school district had been found to be unitary and still was unitary in all of
the areas specified in Green. 247 However, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed this decision because it said the injunction had not been terminated;
therefore, the plaintiffs were still able to challenge the offending program.2"m
On remand, the district court determined that the changing demographics had
made it impossible for the school district to employ the plan they had been under
and that the school district had complied with the order in good faith for more than
ten years. 249 It further concluded that the present segregation could not be proven
to be a result of the past state-imposed segregation or of discriminatory intent.25
The district court therefore lifted the injunction from the now unitary school sys-
tem. 251 Again, the court of appeals reversed, basing its decision on common in-
junctive principles which were not uniquely suited to injunctions of this nature
and, for that reason, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.25 2
The Supreme Court spent a great deal of time discussing the differing views of
when a school district can be considered unitary and in so doing admitted that it
would be impossible to give the term a precise definition. 2 3 However, it did agree
with the terms used often by lower federal courts which use "'dual' to denote a
school system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students by race,
and 'unitary' to describe a school system which has been brought into compliance
with the command of the Constitution." 2' The Court then turned to whether the
district court was correct in finding that the school system had been unified and
that the injunction should be lifted.255
The Supreme Court found it necessary to remand the case to the district court to
look to all of the Green factors in determining whether de jure segregation had
been eliminated in the school district.256 It concluded by stating that if the district





250. Id. at 634-35.
251. Id. at 635.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 635-36. Here, the Court also determined that the plaintiffs did have a right to appeal the dissolution
of the injunction despite their previous failure to appeal because the injunction itself was not lifted at the same
time that the case had been closed. Id. at 635.
254. Id. at 636.
255. Id. at 636-37. The Court also determined that the court of appeals had used the incorrect standard in re-
versing the judgment because of the unique nature of injunctions of this type. Id. at 636. The Court stated that
these injunctions had always been meant to be a temporary means of bringing a school district into compliance
and not a permanent feature of the school system. Id. at 637.
256. Id. at 638 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
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Freeman v. Pitts2" also looked at the power and the responsibilities of the dis-
trict court in choosing to lift a desegregation order but with a slightly different
twist. In Freeman, the Supreme Court looked at the ability of the district court to
relinquish its control over a school district in increments.259 The Court reached an
eight-zero decision in determining that the district court had the authority to relin-
quish control of DCSS in stages.
2 60
In this opinion, the Court stated that the district court's discretion to order a
partial relinquishment of a desegregation case "derives both from the constitu-
tional authority which justified its intervention in the first instance and its ultimate
objectives in formulating the decree."26' The Court went on to address again the
two objectives of judicial intervention in school desegregation cases: "to remedy
the violation and in addition to restore state and local authorities to the control of a
school system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution. "22 It stated
also that a "transition phase" in which the authority to control the school district is
returned to the school board in stages would be appropriate.263 The Court then
gave three factors for the district court to consider in determining whether this par-
tial withdrawal should be effectuated:
[1] whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those
aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn; [2] whether retention of
judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in
other facets of the school system; and [3] whether the school district has demon-
strated. . . its good faith commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those
provisions of the law and the constitution that were the predicate for judicial inter-
vention in the first instance. 2"
The district court was then advised to give closer scrutiny to the question of
whether the school district has shown good faith in its policies and a true attempt to
eliminate evidence of past racial discrimination. 
2 65
After this discussion, the Supreme Court held that "the Court of Appeals did err
in holding that, as a matter of law, the District Court had no discretion" to return
partial control to the school district.266 The Court further stated that it was up to
257. Id.
258. 112 S. Ct. 1430(1992).
259. Id. at 1436.
260. Justice Thomas took no part in this decision.
261. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445.
262. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1446.
265. Id.
266. Id. (emphasis added).
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the discretion of the district court to address each Green factor separately, while
keeping in mind that these factors are in many ways connected to each other.26
The Supreme Court, however, ordered further inquiry into the adequacy of the de-
segregation in the area of attendance, stating that a finding of lack of bad faith is
not necessarily equal to a finding of good faith.268
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, reminded that the district court had
found that the discrepancies in student assignments resulted from residential pat-
terns and not from the past dejure segregation.269 He warned that the Court's argu-
ment of an "affirmative duty" to those school districts practicing racial
discrimination has often been incorrectly interpreted "to speak as though the Con-
stitution requires such racial balancing."27 He further argued that the time was
coming that the burden of proof should shift back to the plaintiff in these cases be-
cause of the great progress made in desegregation and the incredible difficulty in
proving segregation is not a product of past governmental action.2 71 He reiterated
that "[t]he constitutional right is equal racial access to schools, not access to ra-
cially equal schools."272
Justice Souter, also concurring, stated that while the district court does have the
authority to relinquish its control of the school district in stages, "it should make a
finding that there is no immediate threat of unremedied Green-type factors caus-
ing population or student enrollment changes that in turn may imbalance student
composition. 273 Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, joined by Justices
Stevens and O'Connor, agreed with neither the ruling of the district court nor the
ruling of the court of appeals.274 In first stating that the district court, through
equitable principles, did have the authority to partially release the school board
from its affirmative duty, Blackmun continued by arguing that the facts of this par-
ticular case did not merit such a finding. 271
V. ANALYSIS
"[T]he Supreme Court has demonstrated increasing antipathy toward race-con-
scious remedies designed to overcome discrimination in education. . . ." So says
Sonia R. Jarvis in her essay, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum. 2 76 But is she
correct? At first glance, one might think that certainly the Supreme Court has
been giving less protection to minority students than ever before. After all, most of
the recent cases have served to limit the equitable powers of the district courts
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1450.
269. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1450 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
270. Id. at 1451.
271. Id. at 1452.
272. Id.
273. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1455 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
274. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1455 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
275. Id.
276. Sonia R. Jarvis, Essay, Brown and theAfrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285, 1285-86 (1992).
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rather than to broaden them as was seen in the cases after Brown. 277 However, ap-
pearances do not always represent reality, as may be the case here.
On looking at the Supreme Court cases since Brown, it is apparent that the di-
rectives of that case are still being followed. Despite arguments to the contrary, the
Supreme Court has remained consistent with its rulings, stating in each case that
the elimination of de jure segregation must be achieved by employing whatever
means necessary. However, as Freeman v. Pitts indicates, many problems arise
when trying to apply the past rulings of the Court to the unique factual situations
today. Societal changes have done much to hamper the effectiveness of these rul-
ings, making the mandates of the original Brown case virtually unworkable. One
of the main reasons for the present difficulties in school desegregation cases is the
difficulty of the burden of proof.
A. Burden of Proof
After the massive resistance to Brown, the Supreme Court, in Swann, placed
the burden of proof in school desegregation cases on the school districts. In thus
ruling, the Court stated that because of the past practices of dejure segregation,
the existence of racially identifiable schools within a district creates a presumption
of state-imposed discrimination. This presumption is rebuttable only by specific
evidence by the school board to prove that the segregation resulted from other fac-
tors and not from the prior governmental actions.278
This presumption places a heavy burden on the school districts, for it is often
difficult to tell exactly what has caused a certain school to become or remain seg-
regated. 79 Perhaps this burden was placed on the school district early on as a pro-
tection for the minority students. As early as Brown, the Supreme Court has
stressed its finding that segregation itself does not violate the Constitution without
some state action creating it.28 Therefore, placing this burden on the school sys-
tems has made it possible to grant relief to minority students where the school dis-
tricts might otherwise be able to hide behind society's segregation and avoid its
duty to do whatever is possible to provide equal educational opportunities for all of
its students.
However, this burden might not always stay with the school districts, as Free-
man v. Pitts suggests.281 In fact, Freeman states that "[als the de jure violation be-
comes more remote in time and these demographic changes intervene, it becomes
less likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior
dejure system."282 As more school districts continue to make great strides in their
277. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1976); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424 (1976). But see United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v.
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1972).
278. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
279. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1452 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
280. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
281. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1453-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
282. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992).
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attempts at desegregation, minority students will no longer be able to point to the
time when segregation by law prevented them from enjoying the equal educational
opportunities enjoyed by white students across the country. The time is coming
when this burden will shift back to the minority plaintiffs to prove, not only that
segregation exists but also that the segregation is a result of state or school district
action.28 After all, the Supreme Court has stated many times that once a school
system has become unified, it no longer has an affirmative duty to desegregate but
need only present a race neutral program for its school system. 284 With this, the
school boards will not be held responsible for any segregation resulting from fac-
tors outside of their duty and power.28
Certainly, this time is coming, but is it coming too soon? One might argue that
it has been nearly forty years since the Supreme Court first abolished the "separate
but equal" doctrine in our nation's public schools. Forty years certainly seems like
a long time; however, consider the fact that more than ten years after Brown many
states still had laws which had the effect of preventing minority students from at-
tending school with white students." Remembering this, forty years does not
seem like such a long time. But the Supreme Court is correct in determining that it
never meant for the district courts to maintain control over school districts for-
ever. 27 After all, it is vital for local schools systems and local governments to be
able to have control over their own affairs.
Freeman makes it clear that the Court is willing to begin to ease the burden on
school districts to prove such a difficult proposition.289 Therefore, the question be-
comes how best to accomplish the goal of returning control of education to the
states while continuing to ensure that the constitutional rights of minority students
are being upheld.
Questions arise as to how to lift this difficult burden from the school districts
while continuing to offer the protection to the minority students afforded by
Brown. As Martha M. McCarthy states in Elusive "Unitary Status",29 "[c]riteria
have been lacking for school officials and judges to use in determining when a
school district's affirmative duty has been fulfilled."291 Certainly, it is often diffi-
cult to determine when a school district has been acting consistently with the con-
stitutional requirements. However, Freeman does center on one criterion in
particular that has been found in other school desegregation cases: good faith.22
283. See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1453-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
284. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, I11 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991).
285. See, e.g., id.
286. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
287. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1448.
290. Martha M. McCarthy, Ph.D., Elusive "Unitary Status,"69 W. Enuc. L. REP. 9, 13 (1991) [hereinafter
McCarthy].
291. Id.
292. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446.
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B. Good Faith
Freeman did indeed reiterate the importance of the school district's exercise of
good faith in complying with a court order in order to be found to be unitary.293 In
fact, it stated that it was one of the most important factors to consider in this re-
gard. This ruling finds support in past desegregation cases.29
The first Supreme Court case to address the requirement of good faith was
Green. 29 Green, in addressing the effectiveness of freedom-of-choice programs in
eliminating segregation, said that the district courts should maintain jurisdiction
over the case until the school district has complied with its mandates in good
faith."7 This statement was made while the Supreme Court was granting the dis-
trict court broad discretion to pattern a remedy it found to be justified by the
wrong.298 By discussing the issue of good faith at this point, the Supreme Court
was perhaps trying to set guidelines for the eventual return of control to the school
district, a goal second only to desegregation itself.
299
Dowell proposed that "the federal judiciary should terminate supervision of
school districts where school boards have complied with desegregation mandates
in good faith for a reasonable period of time and eliminated vestiges of dejure seg-
regation 'as far as practicable. '"'I" Good faith was also an essential element of Day-
ton where the Court determined that the remedy exceeded the scope of the
violation because the district court had determined that segregation existed with-
out finding any evidence of racial discrimination."0 ' In a situation such as this, a
finding of good faith might lead the courts to determine that the rebuttable pre-
sumption borne by the school district in Swann is no longer appropriate for the sit-
uation.
Freeman stated that "[t]he causal link between current conditions and the prior
violation is even more attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its good
faith."3"2 Here again, the Court allows an opportunity for the school districts to re-
gain control of their systems by using the existence of good faith compliance to re-
lax somewhat the burden which is present in school desegregation cases. In so
doing, the Supreme Court allows an opportunity for the school districts to make
strides toward unification of their schools.
This finding of good faith is very important because a finding of unification
greatly changes the scope of the evaluation. As Dr. McCarthy further states, "a
293. Id. at 1448.
294. Id. at 1446.
295. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
296. Green, 391 U.S. at 430.
297. Id. at 439.
298. Id.
299. See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445.
300. McCarthy, supra note 290, at 13.
301. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,417-18 (1976).
302. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1448 (emphasis added).
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unitary school district's practices are evaluated in terms of intent instead of their
effectiveness in achieving desegregation. 3 3 If a finding of unity changes the scope
of the investigation in court cases from effectiveness to intent, then it will have a
dramatic impact on school desegregation cases without ever departing from the
basic principles set forth in Brown.
C. Supreme Court's Role
The Supreme Court has indeed remained constant in its goal since the first
school desegregation case it heard. The Court has often given broad latitude to the
district courts which have found school districts to be operating in a racially dis-
criminatory manner.304 However, each time the Court has done so it has been with
a reminder that desegregation for the sake of desegregation is not the aim of the
courts of the nation; it is only when the segregation has resulted from some consti-
tutional violation that the courts may act, and in acting, the Court has continued to
give the same guidelines.
Freeman reiterates all of the fundamental principles of equity found in the pre-
ceding school desegregation cases. 3° Here, the Court has seemingly relaxed these
principles to some degree, perhaps recognizing that the sweeping changes made
necessary early in the fight for racial equality have become unnecessary and at
some times even detrimental. However, it still seems to be trying to hold to a prop-
osition that has lost its usefulness, due in part to the changing nature of local school
systems.
A very important fact to reiterate is that in the very beginning, the Supreme
Court placed both the authority and the duty in the hands of the district courts to
investigate these instances of racial discrimination and determine what would be
an appropriate remedy for them. This was done because the district courts, being
local, were in a better position to maintain an active role in the desegregation effort
and were better able to collect information and make determinations upon this
data. 38 This order is consistent with the overall scheme of the Supreme Court,
which is by nature not equipped to deal with issues of this kind. In fact, the Su-
preme Court, as such, is supposed to act only when it has been shown that the dis-
trict courts and subsequently the courts of appeals have exceeded their power as
defined by the Court.
Thus, it has been necessary for the Supreme Court to set down guidelines for
the lower courts to use in fashioning these remedies, and it has faithfully done so.
While many may argue that these guidelines are vague, it is because of the nature
of equity jurisdiction that this is so. Equitable principles are meant to be broad and
303. McCarthy, supra note 290, at 17 (first emphasis added).
304. See supra note 118.
305. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443-45.
306. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
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flexible and only to be interfered with when they exceed the bounds set by the Su-
preme Court.3 7
Freeman reiterates these principles of equity by stating that "[t]he essence of a
court's equity power lies in its inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible
and practical way. 318 The Court here stresses the need for flexibility in determin-
ing the appropriate remedies in cases dealing with racial discrimination.3"9 This
flexibility allows the lower courts broad discretion in determining the steps neces-
sary for desegregation in its particular school systems. This is so largely because of
the need for flexible boundaries which enable the district courts to decide the ap-
propriate remedy in each case.
The boundaries set by the Supreme Court have indeed been broad. Since Brown
the Supreme Court has required a finding of a constitutional violation for the dis-
trict courts to be empowered to take charge of the school districts which would
normally have a right to remain autonomous."' However, once this violation has
been shown to exist, the Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed sweeping mea-
sures to be employed in bringing about the end of this constitutional violation .311
In fact, this power has been checked only when the Supreme Court has found that
the courts have ordered a remedy that goes beyond the scope of the violation it-
self.
312
Looking to the past school desegregation cases, it becomes apparent that most
deal, not in determining whether a constitutional violation exists, but in determin-
ing if an appropriate remedy has been offered.313 Thus, any alleged inconsistency
in these rulings comes not in the law itself but in the position of the case when it is
heard. In each case the Court has said that the "punishment must fit the crime."
Thus, any check on the district court's equitable authority has come only upon a
holding of the Supreme Court that the lower court did not pattern the remedy after
the violation. 14
For instance, Swann allowed sweeping remedies from the district court because
of the pervasive nature of the continued effects of the constitutional violation.
315
Also, Wright and Scotland Neck allowed the courts to prevent the creation of new
school districts because the previous combined school districts had engaged in dis-
criminatory practices, and there was evidence that separating the districts would
further segregate the children. 16
307. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,420 (1976).
308. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1444.
309. Id.
310. See supra notes 41-257 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 119.
312. See, e.g., Dayton, 433 U.S. at 418; Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976).
313. See supra notes 41-257 and accompanying text.
314. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,420 (1976).
315. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,21 (1971).
316. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 464-66 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of
Educ., 407 U.S. 484,489 (1972).
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On the other hand, the times in which the Supreme Court has limited the exer-
cise of equitable remedies have also centered around the relationship between the
remedy and the violation. 17 For example, the use of inter-district remedies for in-
tra-district violations was found to exceed the power of the court.31 In so holding,
the Court did not find the inter-district remedies themselves to be inappropriate;
they were only inappropriate in this case where all affected parties were not ad-
judged to be acting contrary to the Constitution.1 a Also, the Court in Dayton
found that the court of appeals was incorrect in ordering massive desegregative
measures on a school system that had not been found by the district court to be
engaging in massive discriminatory practices .320 The Court considered the proce-
dural aspect of the case far beyond any substantive aspect in ruling that a remedy
may be ordered only after afinding of a constitutional violation sufficient to merit
the order. 321
All of this lends merit to the proposition that the Supreme Court has maintained
consistency throughout its history in determining school desegregation cases. This
stems from the fact that the Court is merely judging the adequacy of the district
court's rulings and fact finding and not determining these facts for itself. Thus, if
any change is occurring in our court system it is occurring on the district court
level and not at the level of the Supreme Court.
D. Future of School Desegregation
According to Martha M. McCarthy, Ph.D., "[slubstantial attention is focused
on the Pitts case in hopes that the Supreme Court will provide school districts at-
tempting to end judicial oversight some clarification as to what constitutes a ves-
tige of segregation." 22 While Freeman did not exactly accomplish this goal, it has
been helpful in showing how a school district is best able to eventually regain con-
trol of its systems. Freeman recognizes the difficulties involved in continuing to re-
quire the school districts to bear the burden of proving that the segregation in their
systems is not a result of prior governmental behavior. It also manages to hold true
to the principles of Brown while allowing some new flexibility in this burden. Per-
haps this is because the Supreme Court recognizes the unique difficulties involved
in desegregating the public schools and realizes that the school systems have only
partial control over this aspect of the schools.
One might think that Freeman v. Pitts serves no end, but I do not believe this to
be so, for I do not agree totally with Wallace Loh in his statement that "[1]aw is an
instrument of social policy." 23 While the effect of the law may be to bring about
317. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
318. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
319. Id.
320. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 418 (1976).
321. Id.
322. McCarthy, supra, note 290, at 18.
323. Wallace D. Loh, In Quest of Brown's Promise: Social Research and Social Values in School Desegregation,
58 WASH. L. REV. 129, 142 (1982) (reviewing ELEANOR WOLF, TRIAL AND ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGRE-
GATION CASE (1981)).
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social reform it cannot be said to be an end in itself for "the effectiveness of a Su-
preme Court decision. . . is not measured so much by changes in people's hearts
as by changes in their behavior."324 Thus, while the Supreme Court may be able to
take great strides toward eliminating de jure segregation from our schools, it is
limited in its ability to eliminate discrimination from our lives.
Life has changed drastically since Brown when racial discrimination was a way
of life. What was once a necessary way of dealing with the effects of discrimina-
tion may now be considered too much of an intrusion into the power of the local
school districts. Brown was both an important case and a necessary one in the his-
tory of the struggle for racial equality. While it is true that this struggle has not
reached an end, it becomes apparent that the mandates in cases like Brown and
Swann have outgrown their usefulness. These measures once necessary may now
be considered detrimental. Freeman, while continuing to affirm these decisions,
seems to suggest just this. Perhaps the role of the Court in school desegregation
cases is just about to come to an end.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is true that our nation's past has been plagued with terrible instances of racial
discrimination. While the United States, largely through the Supreme Court and
the various lower federal courts, has taken great strides in eliminating this racial
discrimination from our cities, especially our local schools, there is still much to
be done. Minority school children continue to be subject to problems resulting
from the lack of appropriate educational facilities, qualified teachers and often ed-
ucational opportunities themselves.
In view of these continued problems, many criticize the Supreme Court, stating
that it has fallen short of its promises in Brown of an equal educational opportunity
for all students. However, the problems of discrimination cannot fall solely on the
shoulders of the members of the Supreme Court, who have through the years
maintained consistency with the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. In fact,
many have criticized the Supreme Court for its refusal to employ its power to de-
segregate for the sake of desegregation, a goal that even Brown held was not pro-
tected by the Constitution.
Certainly, more changes must be made in this country. If change does not oc-
cur, racial harmony will only be a myth with no chance of it ever becoming a real-
ity. However, the courts of this nation, more particularly the Supreme Court,
cannot be harnessed with the impossible task of changing the social morality of an
entire nation. This is not now, nor ever has it been, the purpose of the Supreme
Court.
324. Irving G. Hendrick, Stare Decisis, Federalism, and Judicial Self-Restraint: Concepts Perpetuating the Sepa-
rate But Equal Doctrine in Public Education, 1849- 1954, 12 J. L. & ED. 561,584 (1983).
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